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TRAINING LAWYERS, CULTIVATING CITIZENS,
AND RE-ENCHANTING THE LEGAL PROFESSIONAL
DAVID SANDOMIERSKI
Law schools ought to have a vision for how they
contribute to the public good. This article identifies
two views of how public value might fit into the
mission ofthe law school. The additive view holds that
pursuing public value (cultivating "citizens") and
training "lawyers" are distinct objectives. This view
underlies traditional claims that the law schoolshould
be housed in the university, and also accounts for the
historic tension between academic law schools and the
profession.
By contrast, the integrative view holds that training
lawyers and cultivating citizens are mutually
reinforcing. This view inheres in the desire to ennoble
the concept ofprofessionalism, an old tendency that is
presently in ascendance. A law school that embraces
professionalism can place public value at the core of
its mission, deploying its internal incentive structures
in the service ofthe public good. However, the concept
is at risk of becoming diluted or being imperfectly
translated into practice. Furthermore, a sole focus on
professionalism may marginalize or exclude certain
conceptions of citizenship.
To optimize its public value, the law school that
embraces professionalism should take pains to ensure
it retains its robust meaning. It can do so by locating
discussions about public purpose in the privileged
parts of the law school, and by investing in
pedagogical innovations that truly integrate
conceptions of "citizen" and "lawyer." These efforts
should be supplemented by innovations that promote
diverse conceptions ofthe citizen that do notfit cleanly
into the rubric ofprofessionalism.
Les coles de droit devraient avoir une vision de
leur contribution au bien collectif Cet article identfie
deux visions de la maniere dont la valeur collective
peut cadrer dans la mission d'une &ole de droit. La
vision additive vise la quite de valeur publique
(produire des ((citoyens>) et laformation d' eavocats>>,
soit des objectifs distincts. Ce point de vue repose sur
les prdtentions traditionnelles que Ie'cole de droitfait
partie de l'universild et explique la tension historique
qui existe entre les &oles de droit et la profession
comme telle.
En revanche, la vision intigrative estime que la
formation d'avocats et la production de citoyens se
renforcent mutuellement. Cette vision est inhdrente au
ddsir d ilever le concept de professionnalisme, vieille
tendance qui est actuellement dominante. Pour une
cole de droit qui valorise le professionnalisme, la
valeur collective se trouve au ceur mdme de so
mission, diployant ses structures incitatives internes
au service du bien collectif Le concept risque
cependant de se diluer ou de mal se traduire dans la
pratique. De plus, le seul fait de viser le
professionnalisme peut marginaliser, voire exclure,
certaines conceptions de citoyennete.
Pour optimaliser so valeur collective, I 'cole de
droit qui valorise leprofessionnalisme doit s 'employer
6 en respecter le sens. Elle peut lefaire en ayant des
discussions sur l'utilit publique dans des endroits
priviligids de l'dcole de droit et en investissant dans
des innovations pidagogiques integrant vraiment les
notions de ecitoyens et ed'avocats. A cet effort, ilfaut
ajouter des innovations encourageant les conceptions
varides de citoyen qui ne cadrent pas parfaitement
dans la rubrique de professionnalisme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Critiques that malign law schools for their "broken economic model" frame the problem
of value in legal education too narrowly.' Law schools represent a massive investment of
human potential, public funding, cultural pedigree, and diversified financial risk. All this
investment is in the service of understanding how law - a complex and contested, yet
ultimately public, good - operates. While debt loads and the labour market are important
concerns, the law school must ultimately be evaluated in terms of its broader public value.
To evaluate, one must first understand. And understanding public value is a difficult
endeavour. It requires articulating the disparate, sometimes fuzzy goals ofdiverse institutions
populated by people with different perspectives, goals, political beliefs, backgrounds,
theoretical commitments, and approaches to pedagogy. Yet the questing is worth the effort.
Public value is the foundation of the law school's relevance. If we cannot see that foundation
clearly, attempts to shift it or build upon it could be disastrous.
This article identifies two opposing visions of how public value fits into the law school's
mission. First is an "additive" view: one that conceives the law school's public mission as
something in addition to its function of training lawyers. Second is an "integrative" vision:
the notion that training lawyers and pursuing public value are mutually reinforcing goals.2
These trends imply very different prescriptions and trade-offs for law schools. The
integrative view goes hand in hand with a desire to revitalize and breathe meaning into the
concept of "professionalism." Adherents of integration can pursue public value by
broadening and deepening the concept of professionalism within the law school, and by
aligning the law school's diverse activities and curricular elements towards this singular goal.
The chief benefits of "professionalism," in this revitalized sense, are its capacity to achieve
consensus among diverse constituencies and to deploy the incentive structures of the law
school in the service of broader public objectives.
By contrast, the additive view suggests that there will always be some expression ofpublic
value that cannot be assimilated into "professionalism," however robustly that term is
interpreted. This view compels law schools to actively cultivate and sustain notions ofpublic
value that are distinct from professional goals. The chief benefit of the additive vision is
therefore not consensus but diversity: it ensures that law schools support and encourage a
broad set of ways in which its graduates contribute to society.
See e.g. Brian Z Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), Part IV;
David Segal, "Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!" The New York Times (16 July 2011), online: The
New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/business/law-school-economics-job-market-
weakens-tuition-rises. html>.
2 The Carnegie Report also uses the language "additive" and "integrative," although in the context of
discussing courses in a law school curriculum (William M Sullivan et al, Educating Lawyers:
Preparation for the Profession ofLaw (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007) at 58-59 [Carnegie Report]).
This article uses them in a broader, thematic way.
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This article begins by illuminating the additive and integrative views in selected works
from the literature on legal education and then expands on the implications of each view and
suggests some modest prescriptions.
II. ADDITIVE AND INTEGRATIVE VIEWS
To illustrate the two opposing views, this article considers how two terms, "lawyer" and
"citizen," have been conceived of in relation to one another. By "lawyer" I mean the
paradigmatic product of the "law school":' the unit of labour destined to supply the market
for legal services.' By "citizen," I mean the product of an education oriented towards
citizenship, a term I use as shorthand for the notion of public value. Its use requires some
explanation.
As a way of talking about foundational purposes of legal education, "citizenship" is an
imperfect term, with its connotations of privilege, exclusion, and inequality.' It can imply a
narrow view of public life as related exclusively to the state, apparently excluding a wide
range of social activity.6 Despite these shortcomings, legal educators frequently use the term
to convey a sense of mission with public purpose.' When scholars choose to define it, they
may do so in relatively broad terms - for example, as "intelligent participation in the
politico-legal life of the community."' But it is often left undefined, drawing its strength,
perhaps, from its "capacious" nature.'
As have other contributors to The Future of Law School Conference, I adopt the term "law school" for
the purposes ofthis article while acknowledging the limitations ofthat term. See Roderick A Macdonald
& Thomas B McMorrow, "Decolonizing the Law School" (2014) 51:4 Alta L Rev 717 at 718, n 2 and
accompanying text.
4 The American Bar Association's "law services provider" captures this usage well: Task Force on the
Future of Legal Education, "Working Paper" (1 August 2013) at 3, online: American Bar Association
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/taskforce
comments/abatask force working paper _august 2013.authcheckdam.pdf>.
See e.g. Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 2009); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law's Relations: A Relational Theory of Self
Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) ("[w]ere I to use the term 'citizen' as a
stand-in for the more ambiguous notion of protected-and-participatory-membership, I would be tacitly
excluding people I do not mean to exclude" at 405, n 22).
Cf John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education
(Auckland: Floating Press, 2009) ("[u]nder the influence of German thought in particular, education
became a civic function and the civic function was identified with the realization of the ideal of the
national state.... To form the citizen, not the 'man,' became the aim of education" at 89-90).
See Annie Rochette, "Values in Canadian legal education," online: (2011) 17:2 Web JCLI
<http://www.webjcli.org/> [Rochette, "Values"] (identifying the "value" of citizenship in institutional
documents ofthe faculties of lawat the Universities of Calgary, Windsor, and Toronto); Annie Rochette,
Teaching and Learning in Canadian Legal Education: An Empirical Exploration (DCL Thesis, McGill
University Faculty of Law, 2010) [unpublished] (reporting on individual teachers wanting "their students
to become citizens who would contribute to society" at 131, 202); Kim Brooks, "SchulichLawDean"
(Twitter account), online: Twitter <http://twitter.com/SchulichLawDean> (the current Dean of Law at
the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie writing, "I'm a tireless advocate for the people who make the
Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie great, the city of Halifax, legal education, and engaged
citizenship").
Roger Brownsword, "Law School for Lawyers, Citizens, and People" in Fiona Cownie, ed, The Law
School- Global Issues, Local Questions (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999) 26 at 29; Roger Burridge &
Julian Webb, "The Values of Common Law Legal Education: Rethinking Rules, Responsibilities,
Relationships and Roles in the Law School" (2007) 10:1 Legal Ethics 72 at 74.
Audrey Macklin, "Who Is the Citizen's Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship" (2007) 8:2 Theor
Inq L 333 at 334. See also Kathleen Knight Abowitz & Jason Hamish, "Contemporary Discourses of
Citizenship" (2006) 76:4 Review of Educational Research 653 (identifying seven "citizenship
discourses" in educational literature on K-12 classrooms in the US: the classic discourses of civic
republicanism and liberalism, and the "critical discourses [including] feminist, reconstructionist, cultural,
queer, and transnational" at 656); Dewey, supra note 6 ("[citizenship] may be used to indicate a number
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This article uses "citizenship" as a term that captures different conceptions of public value
in legal education that are distinct from the objective of supplying a market for legal services.
Fostering "participation,"o inculcating "values,"" developing "political" 2 consciousness,
training "critical thinking,"" cultivating "humanity," 4 developing "civic-mindedness,"'
promoting a sense of "agency" 6 - are all examples of attributes that would fall under such
a rubric. The goal of this article is not to reconcile or subsume such diverse objectives into
one concept but rather to find a term that can operate as shorthand to capture the general
inclination to articulate such aspirational concepts.
This section uses the formulation "lawyer and citizen" to illustrate the additive conception
of citizenship - the sense that public value is something in addition to training lawyers. The
integrative view, by contrast, is captured by the formulation "lawyer as citizen."
A. LAWYER AND CITIZEN: CITIZENSHIP As ADDITIVE
The "additive" vision of citizenship is the idea that by learning law in a university
environment, students are acquiring more than an induction into a professional class. The
university's contribution to citizenship is separate from what is needed to train as a lawyer.
Such citizenship virtues not only "add to" professional training, they cultivate a parallel
identity from that of lawyer.
The background claim is that universities, and afortiori public universities, have taken
on the mission to produce graduates who are critical thinkers, broadly knowledgeable, and
cognizant of the various contributions that different disciplines make to social progress and
understanding." The claim that the university has a distinct capacity to cultivate citizens
surfaces in the arguments that liberal arts colleges provide a very different legal education
of qualifications which are vaguer than vocational ability. These traits run from whatever make an
individual a more agreeable companion to citizenship in the political sense: it denotes ability to judge
men and measures wisely and to take a determining part in making as well as obeying laws" at 207). The
term has such elasticity that it is even used by those who resolutely reject the notion that the state defines
law, let alone an identity of public purpose. See e.g. Roderick A Macdonald, "Custom Made - For a
Non-chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism" (2011) 26:2 CJLS 301 [Macdonald, "Custom Made"]
("[t]oday, the puzzle is to discover the extent to which legal texts issued by legislatures and courts ...
authorize a stylized conversation that only tangentially touches the manner in which citizens experience
the everyday normativity of everyday hife" at 308 [emphasis added]).
10 See Brownsword, supra note 8 at 29; Burridge & Webb, supra note 8 at 74.
" See Rochette, "Values," supra note 7; Jeremy Cooper & Louise G Trubek, eds, Educating for Justice:
Social Values and Legal Education (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1997).
12 See Duncan Kennedy, "Politicizing the Classroom" (1994) 4:1 S Cal Rev L & Women's Stud 81.
13 See generally Susanna Calkins, "Enhancing Critical Thinking in Law Students" (Keynote Address for
Canadian Association of Law Teachers Annual Conference, Montreal, May 2012), [unpublished];
Raquel Medina Plana, "Critical thinking inside law schools: An outline" (2012) 2:5 Ofiati Socio-Legal
Series 7, online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssm.com/abstract-2115429>. See also James
R Elkins, "Alternative Currents: One Teacher's Thinking about the Critical Thinking Movement" (1999)
23:4 Legal Studies Forum 379 at 380-81; John 0 Mudd, "Thinking Critically about 'Thinking Like a
Lawyer' (1983) 33:4 J Legal Educ 704 at 706.
4 See Martha C Nussbaum, "Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education" (2003) 70:1 U Chicago L Rev 265
[Nussbaum, "Cultivating Humanity"].
'5 See Anthony T Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals ofthe Legal Profession (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press, 1993) at 14-15, 119-20 [Kronman, The Lost Lawyer].
16 See Roderick A Macdonald & Jason MacLean, "No Toilets in Park" (2005) 50 McGill LJ 721.
17 See generally John Henry Newman, The Idea ofa University defined andIllustrated: in Nine Discourse
Delivered to the Catholics of Dublin, (Salt Lake City: Project Gutenberg, 2008), online: Project
Gutenberg <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/24526/24526-h/24526-h.html>.
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than do law schools." But it also appears when people argue that by situating law schools
within universities, "[t]he outlook is broadened, its larger social significance kept more
closely in mind,"" and that "university ideals ... broad[en] and deep[en] the law-
consciousness of the legal profession."20
That universities have something special to add underlies the "fierce" debates- historical
and renewed - over who controls legal education.2' This jurisdictional fight resembles a
spatially constructed debate, over whether the lawyer's domain of the professional
association, or the citizen's domain of the university, should "hous[e]" the law school.22 This
recurring debate, which Harry Arthurs has described as one over "whether law faculties
ought to provide a liberal education in law or occupational training for legal practice,"23
embodies the dichotomous view of training "lawyers" versus educating "citizens."
The linguistic opposition of citizen and lawyer in the literature on legal education also
reinforces the dichotomy. Duncan Kennedy, for example, describes his famous article on
reproducing hierarchy as an "evocation of the social-psychological pressures that work to
make entering students into lawyers and citizens who will participate willingly in the
reproduction ofthe system."24 Harry Arthurs writes of"the continuing failure of law faculties
to convince their students that the education offered to them is in their best interests not only
as citizens but as future lawyers."25 That becoming a "citizen" is something different from
becoming a lawyer is thus a powerful sub-theme in the minds of those who think deeply and
carefully about what the mission of what legal education should be.26
1 See Woodrow Wilson, "Legal Education of Undergraduates" (1894) 17 Reports of the American Bar
Association 439 (undergraduate legal education gives students "a clear idea ofhow [law] is ... generated
in society and adapted from age to age in its immediate needs and uses" as opposed to lawyers who "do
not think, but swallow formulas" at 443); Austin Sarat, "Crossing Boundaries: From Disciplinary
Perspectives to an Integrated Conception of Legal Scholarship" in Austin Sarat, ed, Law in the Liberal
Arts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) 84 (liberal arts legal education can help question "the
nature of law's boundaries," explore the "capacity of law to be many things at once," and explore "law's
ambivalent and shifting ... relation to morality and politics" at 91-92); Stephen Waddams, Introduction
to the Study ofLaw, 6th ed (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 2004) ("the 'liberal arts' approach is quite likely
in practice to be ... positively harmful to the prospective law student" at 27).
19 JA Corry, quoted in John McLaren, "Searching for the Soul of Canadian Common Law Legal Education:
An Historiographic Update" (Paper presented at the Future of Law Schools Conference, University of
Alberta, 27 September 2013) at 17-18 [unpublished].
20 Ernst Freund, quoted in Martha Nussbaum, "Crossing the Midway, By and By" The Record Online
(Spring 2013), online: University of Chicago Law School <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/
magazine/springl3/crossing> [Nussbaum, "Crossing the Midway"]. Freund used this argument to
persuade the then president of the University of Chicago to open up a professional law school at the
University, instead of a department of Jurisprudence as originally intended.
21 See C Ian Kyer& Jerome E Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A Wright, the Benchers, andLegal
Education in Ontario 1923-1957(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1987); HW Arthurs, "The Tree
of Knowledge / The Axe of Power: Gerald Le Dain and the Transformation of Canadian Legal
Education," online: (2012) 8:6 Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper
Series 25 at 5 <http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/>) [Arthurs, "Tree of Knowledge"]; Task
Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, FinalReport, October2009 (Federation of Law Societies
of Canada, 2009) [Task Force, Final Report].
22 JA Corry, quoted in MacLaren, supra note 19 at 17.
23 Arthurs, "Tree of Knowledge," supra note 21 at 5.
24 Duncan Kennedy, "Introduction" in Duncan Kennedy, ed, Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy: A Polemic against the System (New York: New York University Press, 2004) 1 at I
[emphasis added].
25 Harry Arthurs, "'Valour Rather Than Prudence': Hard Times and Hard Choices for Canada's Legal
Academy" (2013) 76:1 Sask L Rev 73 at 93 [emphasis added].
26 See also Julian Webb, "Ethics for Lawyers or Ethics for Citizens? New Directions for Legal Education"
(1998) 25:1 JL & Soc'y 134 (the hope that legal education can "provide an ethical education for the
citizens of the new millennium ... is not simply a matter of saying ... that the virtuous lawyer is, by
definition, a good citizen" at 149-50); Brownsword, supra note 8.
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When someone states that law schools should produce lawyers and citizens, they are
likely not suggesting that only those who choose not to practice law should develop qualities
of citizenship. Take, for example, Georgetown Law's "aspirations for [its] graduates" in its
Long Range Plan:
First, as lawyers, they should be capable of addressing imaginatively and constructively novel problems
arising from new institutional arrangements and technologies, based on familiarity with the theoretic
foundations of legal materials. Second, as leaders in their profession, they should enjoy and have the
capacity to assess, criticize, and reform laws and institutions. Third, as citizens with the capacity to lead
public debate, they should pursue social justice with wisdom, knowledge and integrity. 27
The author of this statement likely intends that graduates will cultivate all three identities
(lawyer, professional leader, and citizen), yet, like overlapping acetate sheets depicting
various bodily systems, each identity is conceptually distinct.28 This is so, despite the broad
conception of "lawyer" contained in the quotation. The distinctive qualities of the citizen -
here, "wisdom, knowledge and integrity" and the inclination to "social justice" - add
something to even the most aspirational and liberal articulation of what it means to be a
lawyer. Such an example epitomizes the view that "citizen" and "lawyer" are inherently
separate concepts whose combination is best conceived of through the mental process of
addition.
B. LAWYER As CITIZEN: THE INTEGRATIVE VISION
AND REINVIGORATING "PROFESSIONALISM"
Conversely, there is a line of thinking that views citizenship attributes and legal practice
as mutually reinforcing. On this view, educating lawyers cultivates skills that have broad
public value beyond the practice of law; correlatively, such citizenship attributes are
necessary for adequately preparing students to practice law well.
This integrative vision has roots in the nineteenth century tradition of the "lawyer-
statesman," a concept that Anthony Kronman expounded theoretically in the late twentieth
century. Later iterations of the idea also surface in Harry Arthurs' "humane professionalism"
and in the Carnegie Report's "civic professionalism." While not identical, these three
concepts share the notion that the citizen-lawyer dichotomy is false, and that the two
concepts are mutually reinforcing. The integrative view also corresponds with an ambition
to reinvigorate the concept of the legal "professional." To develop these connections,
Kronman's argument is outlined below and used to understand the other iterations of this
integrative vision.
I. THE LAWYER-STATESMAN IN THELOSTLA WYER
In The Lost Lawyer, Anthony Kronman envisions that lawyer and citizen are intertwined
in at least two ways:
2 "JD Program," online: Georgetown Law <http://www.law.georgetown.edulacademics/academic-
programs/jd-program/index.cfm> [emphasis in original].28 See e.g. Anatomical Chart Company, RapidReview Anatomy Reference Guide: A Guidefor Self-Testing
and Memorization, 3d ed (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams and Wilkins, 2010).
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The outstanding lawyer, as this ideal presents him, is, to begin with, a devoted citizen. He cares about the
public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being for it, unlike those who use the law merely to
advance their private ends. The spirit of citizenship that sets the lawyer-statesman apart from the purely self-
interested practitioner of law can to that extent be understood in motivational terms. But it is not only his
motives that make him a better citizen than most. He is distinguished, too, by his special talent for
discovering where the public good lies and for fashioning those arrangements needed to secure it. The
lawyer-statesman is a leader in the realm of public life, and other citizens look to him for guidance and
advice, as do his private clients.2 9
A concept of citizenship is thus both a precondition to being a lawyer ("to begin with")
and an essential part of the lawyer's training (it gives the lawyer his "special talent"). Only
in the hypothetical case of the "purely self-interested practitioner of law," a narrowness in
professional role that Kronman goes on to reject,30 are "lawyer" and "citizen" conceived of
as separate.
Instead, the lawyer-statesman ideal intimately combines these concepts. The statesman has
two chief virtues, which are both taught in law schools and necessary for practicing law well.
These are the virtues of deliberative wisdom (which Kronman also calls "practical wisdom,"
referencing Aristotle)" and civic-mindedness.32
Deliberative wisdom requires an ability to practice imaginative sympathy, a "bifocal"
ability to be simultaneously compassionate and detached." When confronted with intractable
values, the statesman must be able to sympathize with both views - to "place oneself
imaginatively in the position of others and to entertain their concerns in the same affirmative
spirit they do, while remaining uncommitted to the values and beliefs that give these
concerns their force."34 Only by doing so may the statesman "say whether his own
preliminary views should be revised and ... make an informed choice among the alternatives
before him."" Such a good is related to the virtue of civic-mindedness, a commitment to the
public interest as opposed to narrow self-interest.
Inside the law school, the case method cultivates the virtue of sympathetic detachment."
By placing themselves in the positions of opposing litigants, students cultivate an
29 Kronman, supra note 15 at 14-15. Kronman uses the masculine pronoun throughout his book, a practice
I adopt for convenience in discussing Kronman's writing.
3 Ibidat 128-34, 147-49.
31 Ibid at 41.
32 Ibid ("two traits set the statesman apart: first, love of the public good, and second, wisdom in
deliberating about it" at 54).
3 Ibid at 72. Kronman also refers to the quality as "sympathetic detachment" (ibid at 98).
34 Ibid at 98.
3s Ibid.
36 Kronman writes ibid at 113:
[B]y playing the roles of the original contestants or their lawyers[, the case method] forces [law
students] to see things from a range of different points of view and to entertain the claims
associated with each, broadening their capacity for sympathy by taxing it in unexpected ways. But
it also works in the opposite direction. For the student who has been assigned a partisan position
and required to defend it is likely to be asked a moment later for his views regarding the wisdom
of the judge's decision in the case. To answer, he must disengage himself from the sympathetic
attachments he may have formed as a committed, if imaginary, participant and reexamine the case
from a disinterested judicial point of view. The case method thus works simultaneously to
strengthen both the student's powers of sympathetic understanding and his ability to suppress all
sympathies in favor of a judge's scrupulous neutrality.
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appreciation for multiple and possibly irreconcilable moral positions; by adopting a judicial
perspective, they cultivate an instinct to exercise "reasoned judgment under conditions of
maximum moral ambiguity."" Thus the case method, common training to all lawyers, instills
the "special talent" for deliberating about the public good.
The case method also instills civic-mindedness by emphasizing thejudge's perspective."
The judge, by definition, is "public-spirited" and "concerned with the well-being ofthe larger
community."39 This manifests in the judge's "interest in the administration of justice, in the
integrity or well-being of the legal system as a whole."40 By judicial role-playing, students
assume the public-spirited attitude and soon, "[b]y a process of transference that the case
method deliberately exploits, the judicial attitude that a student begins by mimicking
becomes to some degree his own."4'
Outside the law school, in legal practice, citizenship qualities also play an integral role.
Kronman argues that all typical "law jobs" require imaginative sympathy, the core of
deliberative wisdom.42 The good counselor assists his client in deliberating about ends, which
requires the lawyer to view things from the client's perspective - to exercise "third-personal
deliberation."43 Advocates also function sometimes as counselors, so should view it as an
important attribute."
The good lawyer must also possess the quality of civic-mindedness. To be fully effective,
both counselor and advocate need to view their clients' situations from the judge's
perspective. They can only do this if they share the judge's commitment to the law's well-
n Ibid at 117 ("[t]he result is ... an expanded capacity for sympathetic understanding coupled with the
ability to see every claim with the coldest and most distant, most judicial, eye; a broad familiarity with
diverse and irreconcilable human goods coupled with an indefatigable willingness to enter the fray, hear
the arguments, render judgment, and articulate the reasons that support it, even when all hope of moral
certainty is gone" at 117-18).
3 Ibid (the "priority of [the judge's] role over others is embedded in the method," largely because of the
"disproportionate amount of class time ... devoted to questioning whether the case at hand was rightly
decided" at 117).
39 Ibid at 118 .
40 Ibid (this concern for integrity is encompassed by "the concern for doctrinal coherence ... for the
responsiveness of doctrine to social and economic circumstances [and] a concern for the bonds of
fellowship that legal conflict strains but that must be preserved to avoid other, more destructive
conflicts" at 118).
41 Ibid at 119.
42 Kronman draws from Karl Llewellyn's typology that there are three types of lawjob: judge, counselor,
and advocate (ibid at 121, citing KN Llewellyn, "The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The
Problem of Juristic Method" (1940) 49:8 Yale U 1355). Kronman focuses his argument on counselor
and advocate, the judge being an obvious point.
43 Kronman, ibidat 130. 1 am grateful to Alice Woolley for raising an important counterpoint to the image
of horizontality between lawyer and client that I read into Kronman's account. Woolley suggests, and
I do not dispute, that by emphasizing the lawyer's "special" talent for judgment, the lawyer-statesman
ideal risks implying a hierarchical relation between lawyer and client, of which lawyers may not be
conscious or conscientious. Furthermore, the ideal may fail to account for the hierarchies of class, race,
and gender at play in the "halcyon" days of the lawyer-statesman that, more than any particular
intellectual quality, might have accounted for the lawyer's special influence. Woolley cautions that the
lawyer-statesman ideal may "ignore the possibility that the client may be special, or may be exceptional
in theirjudgment" (conference question to, and email correspondence with, the author, October 2013).
4 Kronman, ibid at 148.
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being4 - if they, like the judge, are "connoisseurs"46 of law who care about the legal
system's "internal goods":47
The good lawyer does care about the soundness of the legal order.... [H]e shares the judge's public-spirited
devotion to it. This is in fact a condition for his being successful at his work. The good lawyer's public-
spiritedness is not, moreover, something tacked onto his professional skills, a kind of moralistic addendum
to his craft. Rather, it is an essential component of that craft and cannot be separated from it.48
Thus, the "good lawyer" must possess both deliberative wisdom and an internal
commitment to the integrity of the legal system. These are no mere frills or extras, but
constituting features of what it means to be a professional. Kronman's work, therefore,
provides a gold standard for the view that "lawyer" and "citizen" are integrated concepts.
2. THE LAWYER-STATESMAN As AN OLD CONCEPT
In the United States, the term "lawyer-statesman" is a vestige of Republican ideals of
lawyering around the time of the American Revolution, when lawyers viewed themselves as
"uniquely situated and qualified to diffuse throughout society the culture of civic virtue.""
Whether as crafters of the Constitution or everyday commercial lawyers, the elite lawyers
of this period assessed their role as being to infuse society with the high ideals of law. Law
was the "integrative paste ... for binding the separate and particular activities of a business
society into a political unity,"so a "'connecting chain' ... linking ... specific interests ... into
a general interest."" These lawyers, paralleling Kronman's argument that the task ofjudging
inheres in all law jobs, applied these universals to their everyday problems, operating as
"republican mediators" encouraged to "run their offices as little chancery courts."52
This professional ideal was much the same during the same period in the United Kingdom
and its colonies. As recounted by Wes Pue, George Stephen in 1846 spoke of the "solicitor's
business ... extend[ing] to everything," with lawyers as "professional men" exercising "zeal
and ... integrity," requiring a training as "gentlemen."" In Calgary in 1913, Ira Mackay
described the "lawyer [as] really the only man in the community who really makes it his
business to understand the delicate and complex organization of government and law by
which the community directs its activities for common ends."54 From McGill University in
1919, the English law teacher R.W. Lee described the role of the legal educator as being to
45 Ibid at 138-39.
46 A connoisseur of a field of activity is both specially equipped to make "discriminating judgments
regarding [the fields's] ends and aims" but also - crucially - cares about the field's "internal goods"
(ibid at 140-41).
4 Ibid at 140.
48 Ibid at 145-46.
49 Robert W Gordon, "Lawyers as the 'American Aristocracy': A 19th Century Ideal That May Still Be
Relevant" (1985) 20:1 Stanford Lawyer 2 at 4 [Gordon, "American Aristocracy"].
so Ibid at 6.
51 Ibid at 5, paraphrasing John Quincy Adams.
52 Ibid at 7.
53 George Stephen, Report of the Select Committee on Legal Education; together with the Minutes of
Evidence, Appendix and Index (London, UK: House of Commons, 1846) at xxxv-xxxvi cited in W
Wesley Pue, "Educating the Total Jurist?" (2005) 8:2 Legal Ethics 208 at 210 [emphasis omitted].
54 Ira A MacKay, "The Education of a Lawyer" (Address delivered at the Third Annual Meeting of the
Law Society of Alberta, Calgary, 18-19 December 1913), (1941) 4:4 Alta L Q 103 at 115 cited in Pue,
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develop "a sense of professional honour and of civic duty" to be employed in "wise and
sympathetic handling ofthe problems ofour national life."ss The intertwining ofprofessional
role and public duty thus has a long heritage and pedigree in the British commonwealth.s"
Despite the "elitist, exclusionary, classist, and imperialist" character of some of the
authors and speakers, and the "unacceptable" (by contemporary standards) values such as
"British," "Christian," and "gentlemanliness," Pue sees the enunciation of value as a good
thing, arguing that the rejection of these particular values need not lead to a commitment to
"value-neutral" legal education, a position that itself has its own neoliberal values." The
facial terms used conceal a broader theme, one that views professional training and education
for citizenship as very tightly related: "However articulated, the common thread has been a
belief in the powerful cultural agency of lawyers and a commitment to shaping their
innermost beings so as to produce the sort of professional most likely to make positive
contributions to the larger community.""
In both the American and British versions of the lawyer-statesman, then, a preoccupation
with "contributions to the larger community" was intimately connected to the professional
role of the lawyer, whether in private practice or more officially public roles. This old notion,
that the lawyer and citizen are indivisible, has also surfaced more recently, in two major
studies on legal education in Canada and the US.
3. LA WANDLEARNING AND HUMANE PROFESSIONALISM
Harry Arthurs' 1983 flagship report, Law and Learning,9 argued that Canadian law
faculties aspire towards the cultivation of"humane professionalism," which includes learning
legal rules (and how to use them), legal skills, and "developing a humane perspective on law,
and a deeper understanding of law as a social phenomenon and an intellectual discipline.""o
While Arthurs does not develop the "humane" concept as thoroughly as Kronman does
"lawyer-statesman," the term has a similarly public-spirited component." By fusing
"humane" and "professional," Arthurs also arguably demonstrates a commitment to the
integrative vision of lawyer and citizen.
Such a claim is somewhat surprising given that much of the language in the report, if read
in isolation, could be interpreted so as to reinforce a schism between the "humane" world of
the university and a separate world of the profession. If the "basic premise" of the report is
5 RW Lee, "Legal Education: Symposium" (1919) 39:3 Can LT 138 at 141 cited in Pue, ibid.
56 Pue, ibid (discussing Australia and "British" Africa at 213-14).
s7 Ibid at 281; see also Gordon, "American Aristocracy," supra note 49.
ss Pue, ibid at 220 [emphasis in original].
5 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report to the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, 1983) [Law andLearning]. Subsequent references to Law andLearning
will attribute the views of the report to Harry Arthurs, as has been done repeatedly in the past. See e.g.
Ruth Murbach, "Editorial" (2003) 18:1 CJLS 1.
6o Law and Learning, ibid at 47.
61 For example, Arthurs writes that "humane" education would encourage students to "question the
assumptions underlying legal rules, reasoning or institutions" (ibidat 47); "identify standards of reason,
of justice, of effectiveness, by which legal outcomes produced by the interaction of skills and doctrine
may be judged, and perhaps found wanting" (at 49); and "identify ... 'policy issues', 'value choices' or
'practical implications' ... [in] conventional legal materials" (at 53).
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that "what Canadian law schools are doing ... is not academic but professional,"62 it would
be easy to think that Arthurs, in Law and Learning, intended to reinforce a duality between
the humane, public values of the university on the one hand and a more narrow
professionalism on the other.
And yet, Arthurs takes pains to distinguish the professional from the "narrowly
vocational."63 The "humane intellectual activities" make a "vitally important and easily
overlooked" contribution to "preparation for professional practice," enabling lawyers to
become agents of change.64 Arthurs demonstrates his rich vision of the legal professional
when he asks, in the introductory chapter: "Are Canadian lawyers ... being educated ... to
offer [clients] wise counsel in the social and economic implications of their legal problems,
to adapt to changing laws and client needs, to assume positions of political and community
service and leadership, to evaluate critically and help improve the administration of
justice?""
This vision shares many aspects of Kronman's lawyer-statesman: a capacity for
deliberative wisdom (offering "wise" counsel in social and economic context), civic-
mindedness ("political and community service leadership"), and a commitment to the internal
goods of the legal system ("improve the administration of justice"). By referring to both
private practice and more public activities, Arthurs' framing recalls the exalted twin
functions of the Republican lawyer-statesman.
Such an exalted view of the lawyer may be tied to a deeper ambition of the Law and
Learning report, what Julian Webb describes as "the redemption of (legal) professionalism
itself."66 Webb describes the "schizophrenic" nature of professionalism, a term that has been
used to stand "both for narrow self-interest, cynicism, and social remoteness, as well as for
the more noble commitments to justice, integrity, and altruism."" By conjoining "humane"
and "professionalism," Arthurs (on Webb's account) is attempting to "restore the balance,
to re-assert that moral virtue which should attach to professionalism, but which
'professionalism,' without more, cannot sustain."
Arthurs, to be sure, does not integrate lawyer and citizen as intimately as the lawyer-
statesman ideal does.69 Indeed, Arthurs thinks there are limits to what a professional lawyer
62 Ibid at 55.
6 Ibid ("Canadian law schools imagine themselves to be offering a legal education that is humane and
professional, rather than narrowly vocational" at 47).
6 Ibid at 50. Humane professionalism can help lawyers "adapt to changes when they occur, to assist in
bringing about such changes through law reform and other public activities, and to accomplish change
themselves in ... serving individual clients whose interests do not coincide with accepted solutions" (at
49-50).
65 Ibid at 4.
66 Julian Webb, "The 'Ambitious Modesty' of Harry Arthurs' Humane Professionalism" (2006) 44:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 119 at 127 [Webb, "Ambitious Modesty"].
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid at 128.
69 There is no equivalent expression to that of Rufus Choate: "I repeat that, while lawyers, and because we
are lawyers, we are statesmen" (Rufus Choate, "The Positions and Functions of the American Bar, as
an Element of Conservatism in the State: An Address Delivered before the Law School in Cambridge,
July 3, 1845" in Thomas E Woods Jr, ed, The Political Writings of Rufus Choate (Washington, DC:
Regenery, 2002) 189 at 202. Also cited in Gordon, "American Aristocracy," supra note 49 at 7).
TRAINING LAWYERS, CULTIVATING CITIZENS 749
750 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2014) 51:4
can be expected to do," and he accordingly argues for the need for a distinctive place for the
legal academic and scholar - a "safe haven."" Yet just because the academic and the
professional may have different roles does not mean that the two are at odds with each other.
They are more than symbiotic;72 together, they make possible the essentially public function
of the legal professional, and ensure that law is developed, critically interrogated, and
refreshed with public purposes in mind.
Thus to see these roles as integrated is not to regard them as identical: "citizen" and
"lawyer" may be distinct terms, but they are mutually constitutive and reinforcing. This
integrative model is very closely tied to a robust, positive interpretation of the term
"professional," one that seeks to reclaim its essentially public purpose." These themes run
through the core of a more recent comprehensive study of North American legal education:
the 2007 Carnegie Report.74
4. THE CARNEGIE REPORT AND CIVIC PROFESSIONALISM
The 2007 Carnegie Report has a long pedigree. In 1928, the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching sponsored a comprehensive study, undertaken by Alfred Reed,
of the practices and curricula at most major law schools in Canada and the US." The
rationale behind the Reed Report reflected many of the themes of the lawyer-statesman
explored above: "that the lawyer is a member of a public profession [having] responsibilities
which can be effectively discharged only through a due appreciation of his public relation";76
that lawyers recognize "their public responsibility to the body politic," and that, most of all,
"fit methods for training and testing lawyers constitute, at bottom, a problem of government
as well as of education.""
Almost eighty years later, the Foundation sponsored a new study, as part of a five-part
series of studies into the professional training of nurses, doctors, engineers, clergy, and
lawyers." The 2007 Carnegie Report shares the public-spirited vision of the legal
professional of the Reed Report, but offers renewed prescriptions and analyses in light of
70 Arthurs writes in Law and Learning, supra note 59 at 57:
[Practitioners'] competence and understanding is by definition situational, based on familiarity
with the law as it is, and as it changes over time. Their creativity and critical perspectives are
largely confined within the boundaries of the known legal world. Exceptional individuals apart,
few practicing lawyers are schooled in the conceptual approach that would enable them to create
new structures, to achieve new syntheses of knowledge, or to function actively rather than
reactively in order to foresee the new demands thrown up by a changing society.
71 Arthurs writes ibid at 55:
Our own survey of law teachers and deans shows that most of them indeed seek to explore
intellectual and social issues, while other surveys of law students suggest that many of them at
least enter law school with similar intentions. But something happens: the professional overwhelms
the academic. And so it almost always will, until there exists somewhere in each region of Canada
- if not in each province, if not in each law school - a safe haven for academic work.
72 See Webb, "Ambitious Modesty," supra note 66 at 126-27.
7 See also Robert W Gordon, "Professionalisms Old and New, Good and Bad" (2005) 8:1 Legal Ethics
23 at 29.
4 Supra note 2.
75 Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada (Boston:
Merrymount Press, 1928) [Reed Report].
76 Henry S Pritchett, "Preface" in Reed Report, ibid at xi.
n Ibid.
7 Ibid at xiii.
7 See "Professional and Graduate Education," online: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching <http://www.camegiefoundation.org/previous-work/professional-graduate-education>.
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contemporary practices. The Carnegie Report embodies the integrative view of citizen and
lawyer in two ways: it performs a renewed call for the enchantment of the term "legal
professional," and it adopts an explicit and emphatic mode of "integration" to accomplish
this goal.
The authors of the Carnegie Report state in the introduction that the aim of the book is to
contribute to the understanding of "civic professionalism" by "linking the interests of
educators with the needs of practitioners and the members of the public the profession is
pledged to serve."" This implies that the "professional" has an essentially public purpose
whose fulfillment is made possible by a combination of expertise and broad education:
To be a professional in the full sense is to understand oneself as claimed by a craft and a purpose in whose
service to use that craft. Yet precisely because that purpose is a public one, directed toward others,
professionals can also be conscious of the limits and specificity of their domain. With this awareness,
professionals can appreciate other ways of living and contributing to the larger life of their times. They can
be citizens as well as experts.
It is because of their sense of who they are and how they understand themselves in the world that these
professionals' skills become positive assets for everyone.
The second paragraph makes it clear that the broader awareness of "other ways of living
and contributing to the larger life of their times" is essential to the public function of the
professional. Professional skills are "assets for everyone" precisely "because of' this
perspective of the "citizen."
In teasing out the distinctive contribution of the legal professional, the Carnegie Report's
authors invoke many of the themes of the lawyer-statesman:
Unlike physicians or engineers, legal professionals act as social regulators.... Those admitted to practice
assume an official public role. This is most salient in the instance of judges ... [b]ut it is also part of the
official designation ofall licensed attorneys as officers ofthe court. This designation means that, in principle,
lawyers have obligations to see to the proper functioning of the institutions of the law. 82
Lawyers thus have a public role, not only in their capacities as public officials (as "officers
of the court"), but also in private practice (as "social regulators"). Moreover, they are
committed to the internal goods of the legal system ("see to the proper functioning of the
law"). Also, as with Kronman, the paradigmatic role ofjudge (where the public role is "most
salient") carries over into other law-jobs (those of "all licensed attorneys").
The similarities with Kronman's account extend to the Carnegie Report's understanding
of the role of counselor. Recall that Kronman emphasized the need for the counselor to
" Carnegie Report, supra note 2 at 4.
81 Ibid at 30-31.
82 Ibid at 82.
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possess deliberative wisdom, exercising "third-personal deliberation." Although treated more
briefly, similar themes arise in the Carnegie Report's description: "In learning ... [the] role
of counselor, the student is also learning a normative model of professionalism, a model that
puts the lawyer in the role of cooperative problem solver with the client rather than the
distanced expert who solves the client's problem."a
Thus the legal professional grounds his or her identity in a public purpose, reinforced by
a commitment to the legal system's internal goods, and exercises the skill of sympathetic
detachment (as a "cooperative problem solver") in his or her various roles. This is not merely
"vocational" (in Arthurs' words)84 and no thin or cynical conception of the professional (that
Webb highlighted)." Rather, the "professional" is infused with a spirit of civic-mindedness
and ethical or moral responsibility88 that apply to both public and private functions.
If professionalism is the guiding light, then a logic of integration is the path that leads to
the light. For a study that had such a wide-ranging objective and broad empirical basis," the
Carnegie Report's main substantive recommendation is clear and concise: to integrate the
three "apprenticeships" of legal professional education. These are: the "cognitive"
apprenticeship, the focus on "knowledge and ways of thinking of the profession"; the
"practice-based" apprenticeship, the "forms of expert practice shared by competent
practitioners";" and the apprenticeship of "identity and purpose," the reflection on the
"purposes," "attitudes," and "values" of the profession, which include "both individual and
social justice, and ... virtues of integrity, consideration, civility, and other aspects of
professionalism."" Each apprenticeship traditionally "compet[es]"" with the others in legal
education; the authors decry this separation and urge educators to discover how the three may
be mutually reinforcing and compatible.92
For example, the Carnegie Report urges that clinical teaching be more closely related to
case method teaching. The former cultivates the narrative mode of thinking, the notion that
"things and events acquire significance by being placed within a story, an ongoing context
of meaningful interaction."" This type of thinking can function as a corrective to the
8 lbid at 102.
84 Law and Learning, supra note 59 at 47.
5 Webb, "Ambitious Modesty," supra note 66 at 127.
6 Carnegie Report, supra note 2 ("[p]rofessional education is ... inherently ethical education in the deep
and broad sense. The distillation of the abilities and values that define a way of life is the original
meaning of the term ethics. It comes from the Greek ethos, meaning 'custom,' which is the same
meaning of the Latin mos, mores, which is the root of 'morals"' at 30 [emphasis in original]).
87 Ibidat 15-16. Having conducted empirical research at 16 diverse law schools in Canada and the US, the
researchers' "objective was to understand as well as possible what the experience of law school is like,
both for today's faculty and administration and for today's students." They write ibid at 16:
We also asked about the goals and aspirations of students and teachers, about their successes and
their difficulties and frustrations in negotiating the challenges of legal education. We inquired
about faculty scholarship and how it was related to teaching, and we sought to understand how
faculty life was different, depending on faculty background, the particularities of the school, and
the nature of its student body. From all these conversations, we developed a richly detailed picture
of how law school goes about its great transformative work, while we probed gaps and the
unintended consequences of key aspects of the law school experience.
88 Ibid at 28. See generally ibid, c 2.
89 Ibid at 28. See generally ibid, c 3.
90 Ibid at 28, 132. See generally ibid, c 4.
91 Ibid at 28.
92 Ibid ("[i]n short, we propose an integration of student learning of theoretical and practical legal
knowledge and professional identity" at 13).
9 Ibid at 96.
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dominant emphasis on "analytic" thinking, the chief mode of the case method, which
"detaches things and events from the situations of everyday life and represents them in more
abstract and systematic ways."94 Professional practice requires "blend[ing]" these two types
of thinking; figuring out how to do so is the "most complex and interesting pedagogical
challenge in the preparation of legal practitioners."
The authors argue that such an integration of clinical and cognitive leaming also has a
humanizing effect on students, encouraging them to have a greater appreciation of the
"equities," which the decontextualized practice of case method reasoning may sideline.96
"Practical courses in lawyering ... are thus the logical complement to the forced
decontextualization" of the first-year experience,97 but the Carnegie Report cautions against
"more additions" of such courses to the curriculum, pleading instead for a "a truly integrative
approach in order to provide students with a broad-based yet coherent beginning for their
legal careers."99
Similarly, the authors underscore the need to integrate, and not simply add, courses in
professional responsibility and ethics. Learning the law is an "ensemble experience";
standalone courses in professional responsibility miss "an important aspect of professional
preparation,"99 and current curricular approaches tend to marginalize ethical, philosophical,
religious, or equitable concerns.'o The claim is not simply that as citizens, ethics, or even
philosophy, matter. Rather (as with Kronman), they are essential to the actual work of the
lawyer:
In actual professional practice ... [a]t moments when judgment is at a premium, when the practitioner is
called on to intervene or react with integrity for the values of the profession, it is the quality of the
individual's formation that is at issue. The holistic qualities count: the sense of intuitive engagement, of
habitual disposition that enable the practitioner to perform reliably and artfully.'ot
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid at 97.
96 The authors write ibid at 57-58:
Matters concerning the 'equities' of a situation may be aired in class discussion, but almost always
as second thoughts about 'policy'. Or the theme ofjustice may arise negatively, much as the theme
of 'bias' might, when an instructor asks why a court reached a decision that seems clearly to
violate precedent or accepted doctrine. In either case, the tacit message can be that for legal
professionals, matters of justice are secondary to formal correctness.
This interpretation is drawn in part from the linguistic anthropological work of Elizabeth Mertz, who
found that discussion of policy, "social or moral considerations," and "social causes and impacts" in
first-year contract law classrooms has a much more "free-form" discourse as contrasted with the tightly
constructed discourse around "legal opinions." Elizabeth Mertz, The Language ofLaw School: Learning
to "Think Like a Lawyer" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 76-77. The implication of such
"anecdotal" or "speculative" conversations that employ a "broad grab bag" of considerations is
"problematic": the "approach maintains a tight, technical center, but also permits an expansive periphery
of policy considerations. In this way, the legal reading taught in law school classes at once closely limits
the kinds ofwarrants permitted for legal conclusions (to layers of legal-textual authority) and at the same
time encompasses virtually any kind of social data or issues deemed culturally relevant" (ibid at 77).
9 Carnegie Report, ibid at 59.
9 Ibid.
9 Ibid at 58.100 Ibid at 84. See also Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) ("[flew law schools make systematic efforts to integrate legal
ethics into the core first-year or upper-level curriculum"; however, "with modest effort, most faculty
could readily incorporate relevant topics of professional responsibility in their substantive fields. The
real problem is that most prefer not to" at 201-202).
1o1 Carnegie Report, ibid at 85 [emphasis added].
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Holism in training and perspective is thus a key ingredient for performing professional
tasks, in the same way that Harry Arthurs argued that the "ability to stand at a distance from
conventional wisdom, to view it critically" has not only intrinsic worth, but concrete benefits
for practice.'02
Integrating the apprenticeship of identity and purpose with the other elements of legal
education, through "dramatic pedagogies of simulation and participation"o 3 thus has an
instrumental justification - it prepares students better for professional activities. But this is
a broad definition of "professional activities,"" aligned with the "critical public dimension
of the professional life"' essential to a robust, even "noble"' 6 conception of
professionalism. Thus the overarching recommendation of the Carnegie Report, to integrate
the three apprenticeships, both prescribes how to train professionals better and contributes
to the re-enchantment of the notion of professionalism, relying on the claim that the holistic
qualities of citizenship are integral to the lawyer's role and self-conception.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. PROFESSIONALISM
In the integrative view, the legal professional has an essentially public purpose -whether
in officially public roles or as private practitioner, where the paradigm of the civic or
equitably-minded judge informs counseling and advocacy. To exercise these public
functions, the lawyer should not only care about the legal system but should employ a
holistic, humane perspective in executing his or her legal knowledge and skills. Many aspects
of being a citizen are integral to becoming a good lawyer: an ethical consciousness, a
capacity to deliberate about incommensurable goods, a dedication to the integrity of the
justice system, an ability to employ the narrative mode of thinking, and an appreciation of
social and political context.
Such a view, with its re-enchantment of the concept of professionalism, has incredible
promise for the future of law schools. Instead of viewing citizenship attributes as extras, a
robust conception of professionalism views them as integral to training lawyers. A law
school that champions professionalism embraces the opportunity to deploy its internal
incentive structures in the service of a broadly public mandate. Training "professionals" may
defuse the fierce debates by defining a new, capacious common interest. Professionalism can
be a central concept around which diverse stakeholders in legal education can rally.
Embracing professionalism would have several other benefits. Law schools could develop
the concept by privileging it as one worthy of intellectual inquiry and research.o' Also, in
102 Law and Learning, supra note 59 at 49.
103 Carnegie Report, supra note 2 at 28.
1 Ibid("[p]rofessional activities typically blend and mix what the academic treatment of law works hard,
for legitimate intellectual reasons, to keep separate: knowledge, know-how, and ethical judgment" at 81).
05 Ibid (the "apprenticeship of identity and purpose ... opens the student to the critical public dimension
of the professional life ... in attempting to provide a wide, ethically sensitive perspective on the
technical knowledge and skill that the practice of law requires" at 28).
10 Webb, "Ambitious Modesty," supra note 66 at 127.
1o7 See e.g. Trevor CW Farrow, "Sustainable Professionalism" (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall U 51.
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the same way that "thinking like a lawyer" is a shared value among most law graduates, law
schools could, through emphasis and reiteration, help ensure that professionalism emerges
as a similarly ubiquitous value. And by revitalizing professionalism in both of these ways -
depth and breadth - law schools would make themselves indispensable to professional
associations, whose continued influence (and privilege of self-regulation) depends in part on
their ability to demonstrate their profession's contribution to the public good.'o
There is one important caveat. If it is to do all of this promising work, professionalism
must retain its most robust meaning - that integrative view of citizen and lawyer that
Kronman, Arthurs, and the Carnegie Report authors advance. The danger of relying on one
consensual term is that it may be reduced to its lowest common meaning. Given how
complex and various "thick" understandings of the term might be, there is an acute risk that
professionalism would become a label for only a subset of its possible virtues.
Moreover, the transition from concept to execution can come at the loss of nuance. Such
a risk is exemplified by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada's requirement that
accredited law schools offer a stand-alone course in professional ethics and responsibility.'o
Such a recommendation would seem to ignore the Carnegie Report's caution against such
stand-alone courses (they miss "an important aspect of professional preparation") and their
principal argument in favour of integration. "o If the Task Force indeed used the Carnegie
Report as its "guide" for this recommendation,' such a gap between it and the
recommendation suggests that insights from legal scholarship about professionalism are
vulnerable to translating imperfectly into practice." 2
The stand-alone strategy may encourage a limited understanding of professionalism in
other ways. Students' understanding of the term may become synonymous with, and thereby
limited by, the contents of the course. Also, students may not perceive the stand-alone course
to be as important as other, traditional core courses. Law schools could respond to these
shortcomings in a number of ways, each of which would help them integrate a robust
understanding of professionalism into their formal and hidden curricula.
Law schools could begin by locating discussions about public purpose in the privileged
parts of the law school, so that they are perceived as what the institution "really" cares about.
They could invest and innovate in, and create incentives for, pedagogical strategies that
robustly integrate conceptions of "citizen" and "lawyer." For example, core courses,
especially in first year, could be redesigned to cover a broader panoply of ways in which law
1os See Law SocietyAct, RSO 1990, c L-8, ss 4.1- 4.2 (especially s 4.2(3): "The Society has a duty to protect
the public interest").
' See recommendation 4(C)(1.4) in Task Force, Final Report, supra note 21 at 11.
110 Carnegie Report, supra note 2 at 58.
John Hunter, "Professional Education in the Modem Law School" (Oral presentation delivered at the
Future of Law School Conference, University of Alberta, 27 September 2013). Hunter, the Chair of the
Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, credited the Carnegie Report for establishing a
"strong pedagogical rationale for introducing legal ethics and professionalism at the law school."
112 Although the Task Force Final Report refers to the "integrated three part curriculum" of the Carnegie
Report (supra note 21 at 30), it does not address directly its decision to disregard the recommendation
about integration. The closest it gets is its disclaimer that "[n]othing ... limits law schools from
continuing pervasive approaches in addition to the stand-alone approach" (ibid at 34). The Task Force
Final Report does not reference the Carnegie Report at all in its Ethics and Professionalism section (ibid
at 3 1-35).
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and lawyers contribute to the public good. The current emphasis on doctrinal law, especially
in private law courses, could yield in part to examples of legal processes other than courts, "3
to communicate the plural ways in which lawyers function as social "architects" (in Lon
Fuller's words)"' or "social regulators" (in the words of the Carnegie Report). "5
Law schools could also model diverse visions of professionalism outside the formal
curriculum. Career development offices could facilitate sessions in which law professors and
legal professionals (from a broad range of sectors) jointly tease out the transferrable skills
and understandings that legal study cultivates, and explore how these might be employed to
accomplish public goals. The practice of a judge coming in to give a talk about
professionalism in orientation week could be creatively expanded to other fields, other
forums, and other times of the year, to convey broader and deeper messages about how
students can use their legal education in the service of the public good.
A law school that adopts professionalism as an animating concept may also wish to limit
the frequency with which it mentions the term. While the underlying ideas should recur in
different forms, overusing the term itself may reduce it to a mere label for an undefined
subset of concerns. The goal of a school that embraces professionalism is to sustain a
complex, multi-layered sense of public purpose and to perform a dynamic re-imagining of
an old term; simply incanting the word over and over is more likely to deaden the concept,
in the way that a clich6 stultifies the mind."' The greatest danger in embracing the term
"professionalism" may be the tendency to focus on the label at the expense of its underlying
complex ideas."'
"3 Contracts teachers, for example, could incorporate examples from statutes to explore policy questions
and different institutional responses. They could teach contract law from a forward-looking, or problem-
solving, perspective. Or they could examine how informal law governs contracting behaviour. See e.g.
H Miles Foy Ill, "Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts 101" (2000) 44:4 Saint Louis ULJ 1273;
Vincent C Immel, "Use of the Contracts Courses as a Vehicle For Teaching Problem Solving" (2000)
44:4 Saint Louis ULJ 1205; Julie Macfarlane & John Manwaring, "Using Problem-Based Learning to
Teach First Year Contracts" (1998) 16:2 Journal of Professional Legal Education 271; Lawrence M
Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, "Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and Future" [1967]
4 Wis L Rev 805.
114 Lon L Fuller, "The Lawyer as an Architect of Social Structures" in Kenneth I Winston, ed, The
Principles ofSocial Order: Selected Essays ofLon L Fuller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 198 1)
264 cited in Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal
Processes" (2006) 94:2 Geo LJ 553 (arguing that Lon Fuller's many writings evidenced that he "thought
it important that lawyers and law students study all [legal] processes in their locational specificity" at
563).
1s Supra note 2 at 82.
116 See James Boyd White, "Meaning What You Say" in Austin Sarat, supra note 18, 109 at 118-19; George
Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" (1946) 13:76 Horizons 252.
"7 Compare the example of the McGill Faculty of Law, which invented the term "transsystemic" to capture
a truly indigenous and novel approach to teaching law. See generally Shauna Van Pragh, "Preface -
Navigating the Transsystemic: A Course Syllabus" (2005) 50 McGill LJ 71. In recent years, that faculty
is moving away from the term, a testament to the fact that labels often outlive their usefulness.
Professionalism, which is much more generic, much less indigenous, and susceptible to a narrow
meaning (c.f Webb, "Ambitious Modesty," supra note 66), should therefore be approached with even
greater caution. On the limits of language to express ideas in law, see Macdonald, "Custom Made,"
supra note 9.
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B. CITIZENSHIP
However successful a law school might be at integrating a robust notion of
professionalism, there is the danger that such a singular concept (even on its broadest
possible meanings) would limit, marginalize, or exclude certain conceptions ofwhat it means
to be a citizen. For this reason, in the articulation of a law school's mission, it is important
to preserve a zone that lies outside the bounds of "professionalism." Consider, for example,
the following four objectives of legal education. While each of these would have a place in
the law school animated solely by professionalism, the strong version of each might
encounter resistance.
Martha Nussbaum articulates a strong version ofthe widespread claim that legal education
should inculcate critical thinking."' She argues that law schools should encourage students
to "take charge of [their] own thinking ... and becom[e] ... reflective critic[s] of traditional
practice."ll 9 This requires practice in "analyzing and constructing arguments in a Socratic
fashion ... [and thinking] reflectively about the values of ... society, learning to defend
values that are sound and to criticize those that do no stand the test of deliberation."1 2o While
critical thinking is certainly consistent with a notion of professionalism,'21 the full realization
of this virtue in law school may require students to question the fundamental premises of the
legal system, towards whose internal goods the professional is necessarily committed.122
Critical thinking requires distance from a subject; all participants in a law school animated
by professionalism would be presumed to be, at some level, insiders.
Duncan Kennedy argues that law schools should be a polarized place where political
conflicts are brought to the surface and doctrine exposed for ideological bias.123 A law class
is a success for him when students divide sharply along their own political lines, "form
alliances that shift over time ... discover each other as political allies ... [and build] their
own experience of law as a political activity."' 24 This endeavour of the critical legal studies
movement is to show how law expresses politics; the citizen here is the person with political
consciousness and commitment. While politics certainly would be present in a law school
animated by professionalism, the political spectrum might narrow. Kronman, for example,
argues that case method compels a conservatism and "gradualism" 25 in politics and that the
lawyer-statesman rejects the "worldlessness of revolution."' 26 Law schools guided solely by
118 Nussbaum, "Cultivating Humanity,"supra note 14. See also Calkins, supra note 13; Plana, supra note
13; Elkins, supra note 13; Mudd, supra note 13.
" Nussbaum, "Cultivating Humanity," ibid at 267.
120 Ibid at 269.
121 1 am grateful to John Hunter for signaling in his presentation my failure to emphasize this point
sufficiently (supra note 111). See e.g. Common Law Degree Implementation Committee, Final Report,
August 2011 (Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2011), online: Federation of Law Societies of
Canada <http://www.flsc.ca/documents/Implementation-Report-ECC-Aug-201 1 -R.pdf> (Ethics and
Professionalism competency includes the skill to "identify and engage in critical thinking about ethical
issues in legal practice" at 17).122 See e.g. Kronman, supra note 15 at 140-41.
23 Duncan Kennedy, "Legal Education and the Reproduction ofHierarchy" (1982)32:4 J Legal Educ 591.
124 Kennedy, "Politicizing the Classroom," supra note 12 at 84.
125 Kronman, supra note 15 at 159.126 Ibid at 108. This rejection of revolution would seem to preclude certain functions for the law school,
such as Duncan Kennedy's strategy of "building a left bourgeois intelligentsia that might one day join
together with a mass movement for the radical transformation of American society" ("Legal Education
and the Reproduction of Hierarchy," supra note 123 at 610). Libertarian views (which Kronman has
argued against in a different context (Anthony Kronman, "Contract Law and Distributive Justice" (1980)
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professionalism might be inclined to minimize exposure to political views at the extreme
ends of the spectrum, limiting students' capacities not only to expand their substantive
political commitments, but also to exercise their ability to deliberate about competing
political philosophies.
Policy-based reasoning in legal education may also be at risk of attenuation in a law
school guided solely by professionalism. Many professors teach law in order to cultivate a
public policy aptitude - the virtue of being able to design and critique means for attaining
different social ends.127 Such pedagogical approaches, most prominent in (but not exclusive
to) teaching by law and economics scholars, ask students to think of the implications of the
policies underlying legal choices, to extrapolate about the type of behaviour that will be
encouraged by certain rules or choices, or to generate arguments for why one policy should
be favoured over another.'28 Such factors usually require an approach that is exogenous to
the legal discipline, often inviting students to ask, in the legal realist tradition, not what
judges say, but what they "will do in fact."' 29 A focus on professionalism, by contrast,
necessarily privileges the internal perspective of the legal system, emphasizing the mastery
of skills and discourses bounded by legal rationality and existing practices. One study has
demonstrated that in a traditional Contracts class, discussions of policy are "anecdotal or
speculative" in contrast to the rigorous, "tight," and "cent[ral]" discussion of doctrine.'
Such findings suggest that policy aptitude may be considered marginal in a law school
wholly committed to professionalism.
Roderick Macdonald espouses a view of the citizen as a "jurisgenerative" agent.' 3 ' This
citizen participates in law making through the expression of "implicit and inferential
normativity" "independent of any expression ... in the words of a natural language." 32 On
this view, legal education can serve to deepen the student's understanding of the normative
or legal character of everyday life, and to resist the impression that he or she is a "subject"
of unilateral legal prescriptions.13 This strong form of legal agency may have applications
in a strictly professional school. For example, if law pervades human activity (above and
beyond its formal manifestations), then learning law pluralistically can help the lawyer advise
a client based on the full range of normative forces with which he or she is confronted. That
said, a deep commitment to critical legal pluralism also impliedly rejects the idea that
89:3 Yale LJ 472)) would also fit poorly into Kronman's vision of the lawyer-statesman.
127 See e.g. Joseph William Singer, "Legal Realism Now," Book Review of Legal Realism at Yale:
1927-1960 by Laura Kalman, (1988) 76:2 Cal L Rev 465 at 475.
128 C.f Anthony T Kronman & Richard A Posner, The Economics ofContract Law (Boston: Little, Brown,
1979) (suggesting that one pedagogical goal of studying contract law from a law and economics
perspective is to help students participate in the "design of optimal legal policy" at 153). See also MJ
Trebilcock, "The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House
of Lords" (1976) 26:4 UTLJ 359 (economic analysis of law can recommend "policy expedients" to attain
a "socially optimal" level of information produced by the supply side of the market at 373).
129 Oliver Wendel Holmes, "The Path of the Law" (1897), reprinted in (1997) 110:5 Harv L Rev 991 at 994.
See also KN Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study (New York: Columbia
University School of Law, 1930) at 3.
130 Mertz, supra note 96 at 77.
131 Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, "What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?" (1997) 12:2
CJLS 25 at 39. The term "jurisgenerative" is originally from Robert Cover and, while a similar concept
is employed, it is not specifically used by Macdonald. See Robert Cover, "Forward: Nomos and
Narrative" (1983) 97:1 Harv L Rev 4.
32 Macdonald, "Custom Made," supra note 9 at 303, 308.
33 See Roderick Macdonald & David Sandomierski, "Against Nomopolies" (2006) 57:4 Northern Ireland
Legal Quarterly 610.
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lawyers have a monopoly over legal practice.'34 It would be difficult for such a view to fully
flourish in an environment that presumptively privileges the legal profession as the body
tasked with pursuing the public good through law.
Although each ofthese four visions of the citizen could be rationalized to be in the service
of some form of professional training, the full expression of each would likely be inhibited
by an institutional commitment to professionalism as its sole animating idea. Law schools
should therefore facilitate a domain for exploring plural and deep articulations of what it
means to be a citizen. How could they do this?
The first point is that many law schools already do this in many ways, for example by
offering specialized seminar courses, cross-listed courses, and the ability to take a certain
amount of credits outside the law faculty.'35 The law school animated by professionalism
would have to resist the pressures to curtail such practices. But a redefined mission will
create the need and opportunity for other innovations. For example, law schools could
expand the definition of experiential legal education to include experiences that do not
resemble traditional legal practice. Legislative bodies, administrative tribunals, the civil
service, policy think tanks, small businesses, direct action organizations - the list is endless
- all involve formal law in some way. All could give law students a first-hand way of
thinking through how they want their legal education to inform their contributions. Students
could also be supported in order to conduct sociolegal research into the role and presence of
informal law in a broad range of human behaviour. In short, the same pedagogical arguments
that suggest that practical education enhances learning could (and should) be applied to a
broader set of citizenship objectives.'36
Of course, such an initiative would require resources - intellectual and financial - as
would championing and better integrating other less "professionalized" elements of the law
school, such as the graduate program."' Whatever the approach taken, law schools should
invest and innovate in order to signal to students that who they are becoming as professionals
and as citizens are equally important concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current crisis in the debate on legal education yields an opportunity to reaffirm and
redefine the law school's contribution to the public good. Because questions of efficiency
and market demands currently predominate, the space is wide open to shift the debate toward
one about public value - a much more virtuous and sustaining inquiry. Academic law
134 That legal professionals do not have a monopoly over legal advice, legal practice, or the broader
concepts of law reform is a direct implication of the anti-nomopolistic commitment. Macdonald &
Sandomierski, ibid; Macdonald, "Custom-Made," supra note 9 at 310, 326.
35 See e.g. Martha Nussbaum, "Crossing the Midway," supra note 20 (outlining the strong administrative
support for interdisciplinary pursuits at the University of Chicago).
13 See e.g. Carnegie Report, supra note 2 at 95; Roy Stuckey et al, Best Practices for Legal Education:
A Vision andA Road Map, Ist ed (Clinical Legal Education Association, 2007), online: Clinical Legal
Education Association <http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best practices-cover. pdf>. For
a comprehensive recent survey on experiential legal education in Canada, see Douglas Ferguson,
"Experiential Learning Programs in Canadian Law Schools" (Paper Presented at Canadian Association
of Law Teachers' Annual Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, June 4, 2013), [unpublished].
13 See Rosalie Jukier & Kate Glover, "Forgotten? The Role of Graduate Legal Education in the Future of
the Law Faculty" (2014) 51:4 Alta L Rev 761.
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schools are well situated to lead such a charge. They have traditionally pursued public value,
in large part through their accreted identity as being of "the university," so much of the job
can be done by simply teasing out and articulating current and past practices.
But they also house a large number of people whose occupation it is to write and think.
These human resources, if directed to the task, could greatly advance the question of public
value beyond traditional expressions. Work is needed at both the theoretical and practical
levels. Each law school should articulate its own distinctive expression of how it can best
contribute to the diverse constituencies of the public. Advances in pedagogy need to be
employed and translated beyond their current ambit to serve this renewed expression of
value. This is hard work, but with the right institutional culture and incentives, law professors
are surely up to the task.
This article has suggested that the integrative and additive understandings of "citizen" and
"lawyer" are helpful heuristics for structuring such an inquiry. A law school may legitimately
decide to pursue its contribution to the public good through a vehicle such as
"professionalism" that elegantly integrates the training of lawyers and the cultivation of
citizens. If it does so, it should consider the full depth of the term, rigorously pursue it, and
be on guard against it being co-opted by narrower interests.
But law schools would not fully accomplish (or even articulate) their public mission by
heeding these recommendations alone. However perfectly and richly professionalism inheres
in a law school, there will be worthy visions of public value that are incompletely met in
pursuit of this ideal alone. Just what these notions of "citizenship" are will vary from
institution to institution. But a law school that fails to identify and cultivate some will
inevitably espouse at most a partial vision of its public mission. To fall short in this way is
to leave inchoate the foundational justification for its existence.
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